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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to issues with federal sentencing, the federal crack
cocaine-to-powder cocaine sentencing disparity is one of the most
notorious. The 100:1 crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine disparity took effect
in 1987.1 This meant that, “[f]or any given quantity of crack, the guideline
range [was] the same as if the offense had involved 100 times that amount
in powder cocaine.”2 “[R]epresentatives of the Judiciary, criminal justice
practitioners, academics, and community interest groups”3 have almost
universally criticized the drug equivalency ratio, which has been called
“one of the great stains on our federal criminal justice system.”4 The 100:1
ratio dramatically increased sentences for two distinct classes of
individuals: African-Americans and those with low socioeconomic status.5
When Congress proposed the 100:1 ratio to the United States Sentencing
Commission,6 it “had no hard evidence . . . to support the contention that
crack [was] 100 times more potent or dangerous than powder cocaine.”7
Likewise, the Sentencing Commission also lacked sufficient evidence to
support the 100:1 ratio that it recommended to Congress.8
By the mid-1990s, the Sentencing Commission recommended that
the 100:1 ratio be abandoned, stating that it was unjustified.9 Congress,
however, refused to act on the Commission’s repeated recommendations
that the ratio be significantly lowered.10 Until President Barack Obama
1. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-2 to 3207-3 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012)).
2. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 478 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, REP. TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE & FED. SENT. POLY. 2
(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_
Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200705_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy.pdf.
4. Carol Cratty, New Rules Slashing Crack Cocaine Sentences Go into Effect, CNN
(Nov. 2, 2011, 9:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/01/justice/crack-cocaine-sentencing
(quoting the federal public defender for the Eastern District of Virginia).
5. See U.S. SENT. COMM’N, SPECIAL REP. TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FED. SENT.
POLY. at v–viii (2002).
6. The United States Sentencing Commission is “an independent agency in the
judicial branch of the government” that was established to create sentencing policies for the
federal court system, advise Congress on issues of crime policy, and “collect, analyze,
research, and distribute a broad array of information on federal crime and sentencing issues.”
U. S. SENTENCING COMM’N., AN OVERVIEW OF THE U. S. SENT. COMM.’N 1 (2012), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.
pdf.
7. United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J.,
concurring).
8.
See e.g., U.S. SENT. COMM’N, SPECIAL REP. TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FED.
SENT. POLY. at 195–200 (1995).
9. Id.
10. Michael B. Cassidy, Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-Kimbrough
World, 42 AKRON L. REV. 105, 114–16 (2009) (“On three separate occasions—in 1995, 1997
and 2002—the Commission issued a report asserting the following: (1) the 100-to-1 ratio
was disproportionate to the harms associated with the two drugs; (2) courts could address the
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signed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 into law,11 federal courts disagreed
about how to appropriately handle the unjustified 100:1 ratio, with some
federal courts applying reduced 20:112 and 10:113 ratios, while others
maintained the 100:1 ratio.14 The 100:1 crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine
drug equivalence ratio has received (and still receives) a vast amount of
attention, and has been the subject of much academic analysis and
discussion.15
On the other hand, the problem with the current
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA,” commonly referred to as
“Ecstasy”)16 drug equivalency ratio is an emerging topic that has largely
been ignored and under-analyzed.17 Although the two issues are, in some
ways, distinguishable,18 both the current MDMA drug equivalency ratio and
the former 100:1 crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine ratio are unjustified;
they are both the products of an incomplete and improper analysis of
scientific data and the relative social harms of trafficking and usage.19 The
harms associated with crack through specific non-drug-related enhancements; and (3) crack
penalties fell disproportionately on lower-level participants, most often AfricanAmericans.”).
11. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372; Notice of a
Temporary, Emergency Amendment to Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 75 Fed.
Reg. 661, 88-02.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Leroy, 373 F.Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Wisc. 2005).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 451 F. Supp.2d 553, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Medina-Casteneda, 511 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2008).
15. See, e.g., Alyssa L. Beaver, Getting a Fix on Cocaine Sentencing Policy:
Reforming the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2531 (2010); Jesseca R.F. Grassley, Fed. Cocaine Sentencing Policy Following the 1995
Cocaine Report: Issues of Fairness & Just Punishment, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 347 (1998);
Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, & Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1994); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a
Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233 (1996).
16. JULIE HOLLAND, ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT THE
RISKS AND BENEFITS OF MDMA 2 (2001).
17. See Jennifer Coffin, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Making the Most of the
Need for Adequate Explanation (July 2010) (revised and updated through Dec. 2011),
available at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/procedure_substance.pdf;
Amanda Kay, The Agony of Ecstasy: Reconsidering the Punitive Approach to U.S. Drug
Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2133 (2002); Scott Michelman, & Jay Rorty, Doing
Kimbrough Justice: Implementing Policy Disagreements with the Fed. Sentencing
Guidelines, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1083 (2012).
18. While the crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine disparity disproportionately impacted
African-American defendants, the MDMA drug equivalency ratio has not been shown to
have such an effect. Some also claim that the Commission’s consideration of empirical data
and “national experience” regarding the harms of MDMA distinguish the MDMA drug
equivalency ratio from the crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine ratio. E.g., United States v.
Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d 596, 607 (E.D. Tenn. 2012). The fact that the Commission’s
decision about MDMA sentencing guidelines was based on a faulty and incomplete analysis
of empirical data and of the drug’s social harms, however, makes the two issues more
closely related than they may initially seem.
19. With regard to crack cocaine, the Commission’s false findings include: (1) that
crack cocaine had identical physiological and psychoactive effects as powder cocaine;
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Sentencing Commission failed to fulfill its proper institutional role when
recommending both the MDMA and the crack cocaine ratios. As a result,
defendants sentenced under the current MDMA Guidelines, just like
defendants sentenced under the 1987 crack cocaine Guidelines, are
receiving sentences that are “greater than necessary” to adequately protect
the public, serve as an effective deterrent, and provide sufficient
retribution.20
History seems to be repeating itself. Despite the existence of data
that showed that the 100:1 crack cocaine ratio was unjustified and
unsupported by objective evidence, the 100:1 ratio remained in place for
twenty-four years.21 As a result, federal courts began applying different
ratios. Sentencing uniformity—from one judge to the next, from one
courthouse to the next—began to suffer. Yet Congress could have
prevented years of disproportionate and inconsistent sentencing in crack
cocaine cases by simply amending the 100:1 ratio. Currently, the federal
courts are again applying inconsistent drug equivalency ratios—but this
time to cases involving MDMA.22 Sentencing uniformity is, once again,
suffering.
This Note analyzes the MDMA drug equivalency ratio under the
current Guidelines and argues that the ratio is based on incomplete and
inaccurate information. Part I of this Note provides an overview of the
United States Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”) and the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). Part II discusses the rise
of MDMA and the legislative response. It also summarizes the
Commission’s findings regarding the social and physiological harms of
MDMA that formed the basis for the Commission’s decision about the
appropriate MDMA drug equivalency ratio. Part III examines the errors in
the Commission’s empirical analysis of the harms of MDMA, and in its
comparison of the social harms of MDMA to the social harms of other
drugs. It also reviews the currently-unresolved federal district court split
(2) that crack cocaine use was going to become an epidemic among the nation’s youth; and
(3) the high level of violence associated with trafficking. See Tyler B. Parks, The Unfairness
of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 1105, 1114 (2012) (citing U.S. SENT.
COMM’N, REP. TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE & FED. SENT. POLY. E–5 (2002)). Part III of this
Note will explore the ways in which the Commission’s findings with regard to MDMA were
inaccurate.
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (enumerating the purposes to be served by
sentencing).
21. The 100:1 ratio took effect in 1986 and remained unchanged until President
Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which ultimately resulted in an 18:1 ratio.
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to
3207-3 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012)); Fair Sentencing Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372; Notice of a Temporary, Emergency Amendment
to Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 75 Fed. Reg. 661, 88-02.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Kamper, 860 F. Supp. 2d 596, 609 (E.D. Tenn. 2012)
(applying the standard 1:500 ratio); United States v. McCarthy, No. 09-CR-1136, 2011 WL
1991146 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2011) (applying a 1:200 ratio).
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over whether to defer to the MDMA drug equivalency ratio set forth in the
Guidelines. Finally, Part IV calls for a prompt reevaluation of the current
MDMA-to-marijuana drug equivalency ratio. This Note concludes that a
reevaluation of the MDMA drug equivalency ratio is necessary to ensure
horizontal sentencing uniformity, to prevent inefficient use of judicial
resources, and to ensure that defendants’ sentences are sufficient but not
greater than necessary, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
I. BACKGROUND
A. The United States Sentencing Guidelines
The United States Sentencing Guidelines are the product of
Congress’s attempt to ensure uniformity in sentences across the country by
implementing nationalized rules for federal criminal sentencing. This
section provides an overview of the Commission and of the Guidelines that
the Commission promulgated. First, this section discusses the reasons why
Congress created the Commission. This section then explores the ways in
which case law has modified the Guidelines and ends with a general
discussion about the ways in which federal courts currently apply the
Guidelines.
1. The Commission
In 1984, Congress gave the United States Sentencing Commission
the authority to promulgate the United States Sentencing Guidelines
through the Sentencing Reform Act.23 The Commission consists of seven
voting members, at least three of whom must be federal judges.24 Prior to
the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, “[s]tatutes specified
the penalties for crimes but nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide
discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and for
how long.”25 Congress was unsatisfied with the broad discretion afforded to
judges, however. This dissatisfaction largely stemmed from Congress’s
concern that similarly situated defendants who were convicted of similar
crimes were receiving substantially different sentences.26 Under the pre1984 indeterminate sentencing regime, the length of a defendant’s sentence
could largely depend upon the sentencing judge, the courthouse or

23. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–86, 3601–742
(2012); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
25. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
26. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 315 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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geographic region in which the defendant was convicted, and even the
defendant’s race,27 gender,28 or social class.29
Through the creation of the Commission, Congress aimed to
achieve two main goals: (1) “uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the
wide disparity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for similar
criminal conduct”30 and (2) “proportionality in sentencing through a system
that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of
differing severity.”31 In order to achieve both uniformity and
proportionality in sentencing, the Commission’s responsibilities are:
(1) to establish sentencing policies and practices for the
federal courts, including guidelines to be consulted
regarding the appropriate form and severity of punishment
for offenders convicted of federal crimes; (2) to advise and
assist Congress and the executive branch in the
development of effective and efficient crime policy; and
(3) to collect, analyze, research, and distribute a broad
array of information on federal crime and sentencing
issues, serving as an information resource for Congress, the
executive branch, the courts, criminal justice practitioners,
the academic community, and the public.32
In order to achieve proportionality in sentencing, the Commission is
specifically tasked with ensuring that federal sentencing “policies and
practices” fulfill the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Section
3553(a)(2) requires that a defendant’s sentence be “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary”:

27. Id. at 316 (Justice O’Connor stating, “Indeed, rather than reflect legally relevant
criteria these disparities too often were correlated with constitutionally suspect variables
such as race.”).
28. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING, § 1:3, at 9–10 (2d ed. 1991).
29. Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in Fed. Sentencing: The
Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 301, 303 (2006).
30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(3) (2012) (emphasis added). This
specifically means that the sentencing guidelines should not result in “unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records” who are convicted of similar
crimes. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
31. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
32. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. SENT. COMM’N 1 (2011), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.
pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW] (“The Commission is charged with the ongoing responsibilities
of evaluating the effects of the sentencing guidelines on the criminal justice system,
recommending to Congress appropriate modifications of substantive criminal law and
sentencing procedures, and establishing a research and development program on sentencing
issues.”).
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(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.33
In an effort to ensure proportionality in sentencing, the Guidelines also
require sentencing judges to consider “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”34
The desire to eliminate subjective sentencing decisions led
Congress to create a Commission that could promulgate Guidelines based
on objective criteria. Objective assessments about the harms caused by
different crimes and the effectiveness of sentences necessarily include an
analysis of empirical data. Scientific data is a necessary component of an
accurate assessment of the effectiveness of current sentencing regimes.
Scientific data also provides an objective way to measure the harm inflicted
by certain offenses.35 Because scientific data is such a critical component of
proportionate sentencing, an entire department of the Commission is
dedicated to collecting and analyzing research and data.36 The
Commission’s “characteristic institutional role” requires the Commission to
thoroughly analyze scientific data and to base the Guidelines on that
analysis.37 The Commission is better situated than courts to formulate and
refine sentencing guidelines precisely because of its unique ability to “base
its determinations on empirical data and national experience,” combined
with its “guid[ance] by a professional staff with appropriate expertise.”38

33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2012) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1)(A).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
35. Science alone may not be able to fully and accurately measure the harms caused
by specific offenses, but science provides an objective baseline from which to start. Less
measureable harms, such as social harms, can then be added to this baseline. Without an
objective form of measurement, however, the entire system would be subjective (and
arguably arbitrary). For an in-depth discussion on the relationship between empirical data
and sentencing, see Steven L. Chanenson, Sentencing & Data: The Not-So-Odd Couple, 16
FED. SENT. R. 1 (2003).
36. OVERVIEW, supra note 32, at 3.
37. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007).
38. Id. (citations omitted).
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2. The Guidelines and Their Evolution
The Guidelines, as set forth by the Commission, went into effect in
1987.39 The Guidelines provide a sentencing range40 based on the
defendant’s “base offense level,” which is determined by the defendant’s
alleged conduct41 and prior criminal history.42 More serious crimes are
generally represented by higher base offense levels.43 Likewise, the more
extensive a defendant’s prior criminal history, the longer the recommended
sentence.44 When determining the defendant’s sentence, the judge also
considers factors unique to the individual defendant which are set forth in
the defendant’s Presentence Investigation Report.45
The Commission designed the Guidelines’ base offense levels to
reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s crime. For drug-related
convictions, however, the defendant’s base offense depends on both the
type and quantity of the drug involved.46 The Guidelines contain a Drug
Equivalency Table, which is essentially a conversion table that allows
judges to convert the quantity of any type of drug into “its equivalent
quantity of mari[j]uana.”47 This means that, under the Guidelines,
“marijuana penalties are used as a common standard to which all other
drugs are related mathematically.”48
39. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, U.S. SENT. COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (2003), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2003_guidelines/Manual/2003guid.pdf.
40. A sentencing range is a range of time for which the defendant must be sentenced
to prison.
41. The appropriate base offense level corresponds with the defendant’s conviction.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(1) (2012). “[S]pecific offense
characteristics,” if applicable to the defendant’s crime, are added to the base offense level.
Id. § 1B1.1(a)(2). This level is further adjusted based on facts pertaining to the defendant’s
role in the crime, the harm to or classification of the victim, defendant’s obstruction of
justice, and the defendant’s “acceptance of responsibility.” Id. §§ 1B1.1(a)(3)–(5).
42. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(a)(6)–(7); see also id. § 4B1.1
(2012) (referring to “career offender” status); U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2010 GUIDELINES SENT.
TABLE, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_PDF/
Sentencing_Table.pdf [hereinafter 2010 GUIDELINES TABLE].
43. 2010 GUIDELINES TABLE, supra note 42, at 1.
44. Id.
45. The presentence investigation report is mandatory pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a)
(2012) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)–(d). The presentence investigation report is compiled by a
probation officer and contains information about the defendant such as her criminal history
and financial condition. It also contains information about “any circumstances affecting [her]
behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentencing,” and an “assessment of the financial,
social, psychological, and medical impact on, and cost to, any individual against whom the
offense was committed.” Francis M Dougherty, Sufficiency of Federal Trial Court’s
Compliance with Requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(1)(A) and
32(c)(3)(D), 101 A.L.R. FED. 308 § 2 (1991).
46. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2012).
47. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, nn.10(A), (D).
48. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, REP. TO THE CONGRESS: MDMA DRUG OFFENSES
EXPLANATION OF RECENT GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS 5, n.1 (2001) [hereinafter GUIDELINE
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The Guidelines were initially mandatory, which meant that federal
sentencing judges were required to “impose a sentence within the
applicable Guidelines range.”49 Sentencing judges could not impose a
sentence above or below the Guidelines range unless the judge found “an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.”50 A
defendant’s individual characteristics and circumstances, such as age,
education, health, and disadvantaged upbringing, were not a part of
formulating an appropriate sentence.51
Although federal judges were initially required to follow the
Guidelines, the Guidelines became advisory in 2005. As foreshadowed in
Blakely v. Washington,52 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Booker,
held that the application of the federal Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury.53 The violation occurred because the
sentencing judge increased the defendant’s sentencing range based on his
finding of facts by a mere preponderance of the evidence.54 Because the
Guidelines, as being applied, were in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the
Booker Court stated that the Guidelines would be merely advisory.55
Acknowledging the importance of horizontal sentencing uniformity,
however, the Booker Court left the Guidelines themselves intact.56 The
Court emphasized its desire to preserve Congress’s intent “to provide
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, while avoiding
AMENDMENTS]. For example, the five-year penalty for marijuana begins at 100,000 grams.
The corresponding five-year penalty for powder cocaine is 500 grams. The ‘marijuana
equivalency’ for powder cocaine is: one gram of powder cocaine equals 200 grams of
marijuana. In the powder cocaine example, the 500 grams is multiplied by 200 for a result of
100,000 grams (identical to the five-year marijuana quantity). This value (100,000 grams)
can then be used to establish the penalty found in the “Drug Quantity Table,” located in U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1.
49. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012). The only other circumstance in which an out-ofrange sentence was permitted was when a defendant provided substantial assistance to the
prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
51. Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American Inquisition: Sentencing After the Fed.
Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 13 (2010) (citing U.S. SENT. COMM’N, U.S. SENT.
GUIDELINES MANUAL 449 (2009)).
52. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that Washington’s
sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury because the
Guidelines permitted judges to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the Guidelines’ range
if the judge found “substantial and compelling reasons” to do so. Id. at 299, 305. This
holding was largely based on a rule previously set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, which
mandated that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 466, 490 (2000); see also Blakely, 542 U.S.
at 301.
53. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 264.
56. Id.
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unwarranted sentencing disparities and maintaining sufficient flexibility to
permit individualized sentences when warranted.”57 The Court mandated
that district court judges “consult [the] Guidelines and take them into
account when sentencing.58
Shortly after Booker, the Supreme Court held in Rita v. United
States that appellate courts could “apply a presumption of reasonableness to
a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing
Guidelines.”59 The Rita Court specifically stated that “it is fair to assume
that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of
sentences that might achieve the objectives of § 3553(a).”60 In Gall v.
United States, the Supreme Court further clarified that the appellate courts
must review for an abuse of discretion, regardless of whether the district
court judge followed the Guidelines’ suggested sentencing range.61
According to Rita, the appellate court should first ensure that the lower
court did not make any significant procedural errors.62 The appellate court
should next consider whether the sentence was substantively reasonable
under the totality of the circumstances, using an abuse of discretion
standard of review.63
Under the advisory Guidelines, judges may deviate from the
Guidelines and their decisions are reviewed only for an abuse of
discretion.64 In Kimbrough v. United States, a federal district court judge
who presided over a case involving crack cocaine ordered a sentence that
was substantially lower than the Guidelines sentencing range because the
judge thought that the suggested range was greater than necessary to serve
the objectives of § 3553(a).65 At the time, there was a 100:1 powder
cocaine-to-crack cocaine drug equivalency ratio.66 The district court judge’s
downward departure was not based on factors particular to the defendant,
but, rather, was based on a policy disagreement with the 100:1 ratio.67

57. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)) (internal quotation and editorial marks
omitted). Booker also required the federal circuit courts to review sentencing appeals for
“unreasonableness.”
58. Id. (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult
those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”).
59. 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). Rita also states that a sentencing judge should provide a
statement of his or her reasons for imposing a sentence. Id. at 356. The length and detail
required depends on the circumstances of the case; the judge “should set forth enough to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.” Id.
60. Id. at 350.
61. 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
65. Id. at 92–93.
66. Id. at 94.
67. Id. at 93.
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The Supreme Court, emphasizing the advisory nature of the
Guidelines after Booker, held that the district court judge’s decision to
deviate from the Guidelines for policy reasons was not an abuse of
discretion.68 Two years later, in Spears v. United States, the Supreme Court
further emphasized that Kimbrough was “a recognition of district courts’
authority to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy
disagreement with them, and not simply based on an individualized
determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case.”69
As it stands today, a sentencing judge may impose a sentence
outside of the Guidelines for substantive or policy reasons as long as she
adequately considers the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and briefly explains
her reasoning.70 Judges can (and do) deviate from Sentencing Guidelines
ranges for substantive reasons, such as a defendant’s mental health or
disadvantaged upbringing, and, sometimes, for policy reasons, such as a
disagreement with the Guidelines.71 Data suggests, however, that the
majority of judges do not significantly stray from the suggested Guidelines
range; since the Guidelines became advisory in 2005, the average federal
criminal sentence has remained virtually the same length.72 Data from 2008
68. Id. at 111. The Court noted that the current Guidelines as they pertained to crack
cocaine did not “exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role,”
adding that the Commission “did not take account of empirical data and national
experience.” Id. at 109–10 (internal citations omitted) (noting also that “the Commission
itself has reported that the crack/powder disparity produces disproportionately harsh
sanctions”).
69. 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009). Spears also clarified “that district courts are entitled to
reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy
disagreement with those Guidelines.” Id. at 265–66.
70. Greater deviations from the Guidelines likely require a more thorough explanation
for the deviation. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007).
71. See, e.g., id.; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
72. The average sentence length for federal criminal offenders: 2005=46.3 months;
2006=51.8 months; 2007 = 51.8 months; 2008=49.6 months; 2009=46.8 months; 2010=44.3
months; 2011=43 months; 2012=44 months. See U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF
FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2005/table13_pre.pdf; U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2006
SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_
and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2006/table13.pdf; U.S. SENT. COMM’N,
2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2007/Table13.pdf; U.S. SENT.
COMM’N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2008), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2008/Table13.pdf; U.S.
SENT. COMM’N, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2009), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2009/Table13.
pdf; U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2010),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/
2010/Table13.pdf; U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS 1, tb.l. 13
(2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_
Sourcebooks/2011/Table13.pdf; U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT.
STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/sbtoc12.htm.
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through 2012 about the length of federally imposed sentences relative to the
length suggested by the Guidelines reveals that most judges have continued
to adhere to the Guidelines: throughout this five year period, there has only
been a 7% increase in sentences that fall outside of the Guidelines range,73
and there has only been a 4.4% increase in non-government sponsored
sentences74 that fall below the Guidelines range.75 The largest increase—a
10.2% increase—in sentences that fall outside of the Guidelines range
occurred between post-Blakely 2004 and post-Booker 2005.76
The fact that Booker has not made a significant impact on the
length of the majority of federal criminal sentences likely has several
causes. The presumption of reasonableness set forth in Rita encourages
judges to impose within-guidelines sentences because within-guidelines
sentences are much more likely to be upheld.77 Additionally, the Guidelines
remain the starting point for determining a federal sentence, which means
that absent exceptional circumstances, judges typically will impose a
within-Guidelines sentence.78
II. THE RISE OF MDMA AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
MDMA has existed for over one hundred years,79 but it was not
classified as an illegal substance in the United States until 1985,80 and the
drastic increase in penalties for MDMA-related offenses did not occur until
2000.81 This section discusses the history of MDMA and its usage in
73. Sentences within the Guideline range: 2008=59.4%; 2009=56.8%; 2010=55%;
2011=54.5%; 2012=52.4%. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1,
fig. G (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_
Sourcebooks/2012/FigureG.pdf. [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK fig. G].
74. “Non-government sponsored” means that the below-Guidelines sentence was not
due to the defendant’s substantial assistance to the prosecutor (§ 5K1.1) or because Early
Disposition Programs (§ 5K3.1)/ the prosecutor recommended the downward departure. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K1.1, 5K3.1 (2012).
75. Non-Government Sponsored Below Range Sentences: 2008=13.4%; 2009=16%;
2010=17.8%; 2011=17.4%; 2012=17.8%. 2012 SOURCEBOOK fig. G, supra note 73 at 1.
76. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, fig. G (2005),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/
2005/fig-g-post.pdf (within-Guideline sentences comprise 69.4% of all sentences in 2003,
72.2% of cases in Pre-Blakely 2004, 71.8% of cases in Post-Blakely 2004, and 70.9% of
cases in Post-Booker 2005).
77. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 354–55 (2007); Mark Osler, The Promise
of Trailing-Edge Sentencing Guidelines to Resolve the Conflict Between Uniformity &
Judicial Discretion, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 203, 210 (2012).
78. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1233 (2011).
79. HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 1.
80. Kelly M. Smith et. al., Club Drugs: Methylenedioxymethampehetamine,
Flunitrazepam, Ketamine Hydrochloride, and Y-Hydrooxybutyrate, 59 AM. J. HEALTH –
SYSTEM PHARMACY 1067, 1070 (2002).
81. Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-310, §§ 3661–65, (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 290aa-5b); U.S. SENT. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MDMA DRUG
OFFENSE, EXPLANATION OF RECENT GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS 2 (2001).
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America. This section then discusses the Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of
2000, which directed the Commission to research the harms of MDMA and
recommend an appropriate drug equivalency ratio. After detailing the
Commission’s findings with regard to both social and physiological harms,
this section concludes with a discussion of the Commission’s decision to
dramatically increase the drug equivalency ratio for MDMA.
A. The Rise of MDMA
MDMA was synthetically created in Germany sometime before
1912.82 MDMA “significantly increase[s] feelings of anxiety, confusion,
vigor, friendliness, elation, positive mood and arousal.”83 Beginning in the
1970s, American psychologists and therapists used MDMA in
psychotherapy sessions as a way to generate empathy and enhance
communication and self-introspection.84 In 1985, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) reclassified MDMA as a Schedule I controlled
substance.85 The DEA justified this reclassification by emphasizing its
concerns about MDMA’s potential neurotoxicity.86
MDMA quickly gained popularity in the late 1980s, following
extensive media coverage of the Congressional hearings regarding the
rescheduling of MDMA.87 MDMA became prevalent on college campuses
and was the drug of choice for many young Americans in the rave scene.88
82. HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 1.
83. Janelle Van Wel et al., Effects of Acute MDMA Intoxication on Mood &
Impulsivity: Role of the 5-HT1 Receptors, 7 PLOSONE (2012), available at http://www.
plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0040187#pone.0040187Curran1.
84. HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 3.
85. Smith, supra note 80, at 1070.
86. Steven B. Karch, A Historical Review of MDMA, 4 OPEN FORENSIC SCI. J. 20, 22
(2011), available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/22847460_A_historical_
review_of_MDMA/file/d912f50b02aeb3eee8.pdf. Neurotoxicity “is the ability to damage or
destroy neurons (nerve cells) in the brain and/or other parts of the nervous system.”
JACQUELINE L. LONGE, 2 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CANCER 1032 (3d ed. 2010).
87. Karch, supra note 86, at 21 (“The Congressional hearings on MDMA received an
inordinate amount of media attention. The results might have been expected: demand for
illicit MDMA exploded and soon it was for sale on college campuses across the United
States . . . .”); see also Charles S. Grob, Deconstructing Ecstasy: The Politics of MDMA
Research, 8 ADDICTION RES. 6, 553 (2000), available at http://www.maps.org/w3pb/new/
2000/2000_grob_1139_1.pdf.
88. Karch, supra note 86, at 21. Raves are “underground events” that typically feature
electronic/techno music and all-night dance parties, often taking place in venues such as
“warehouse[s], open field[s], or empty building[s].” Erin Treacy, The Rave Act: A Specious
Solution to the Serious Problem of Increased Ecstasy Distribution: Is It Unconstitutionally
Overbroad?, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 229, 234 (2006); see also HOLLAND, supra
note 16, at 1. A common dictionary definition is, “a large overnight dance party featuring
techno music and usually involving the taking of mind-altering drugs.” Rave, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rave?show=0&t=
1392251102 (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).

280

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 267

Its popularity in the rave scene created concern among legislators, because
many of the people who attended these raves and used MDMA were under
the age of twenty five.89 MDMA continued to gain popularity throughout
the 1990s, and, by the summer of 2000, the DEA estimated that 2,000,000
MDMA tablets90 were being imported into America every week.91 MDMA
primarily affects the brain’s levels of serotonin92 and dopamine.93
Specifically, MDMA blocks the brain’s reuptake of serotonin, while
inducing the brain to release both serotonin and dopamine.94 Common street
names for MDMA include “Molly,”95 “Adam,” “rolls,” “beans,”
“Ecstasy,”96 “E,” “XTC,” and “X.”97
B. The Congressional Response: The Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of
2000
In response to the quickly-growing popularity of MDMA, Congress
passed the Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, which recommended that
the United States Sentencing Commission increase penalties for MDMA-

89. Karch, supra note 86, at 21. MDMA use at raves, “where ambient temperatures
may be high,” also posed further complications because users would “danc[e] for many
hours without adequate fluid replacement.” HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 2. This increased the
rates of hyperthermia among MDMA users, which led to some users collapsing or
convulsing at raves. Some scientists believe, however, that these risks were due less to
MDMA itself and more to “the circumstances in which [MDMA] is misused.” Id. The fact
that patients who used MDMA during supervised psychotherapy sessions did not experience
hyperthermia also supports this conclusion.
90. MDMA tablets typically contain about 50–150 milligrams of MDMA. DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUGS OF ABUSE 60 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/
pr/multimedia-library/publications/drug_of_abuse.pdf. The tablets themselves typically
weigh 250–300 milligrams. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 16. The street value
of an MDMA tablet in 2000 averaged twenty-six dollars in Tennessee. NAT’L DRUG INTEL.
CTR., TENNESSEE DRUG ASSESSMENT (May 2002), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/
pubs1/1017/odd.htm.
91. HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 18–19.
92. “Serotonin has different inhibitory roles in several parts of the brain, and serotonin
concentrations have been reported to modify mood, appetite, memory, and learning ability.”
LARRY L. MAI, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF HUMAN BIOLOGY & EVOLUTION 481 (2005).
93. Id. at 153 (“Dopamine is a key neurotransmitter and basal ganglia inhibitor, and is
involved in several left-hemisphere skills critical to language and thought. Dopamine also
plays a role in counteracting hyperthermia during endurance activity . . . .”); HOLLAND,
supra note 16, at 18–19.
94. Id.
95. Sara Bellum, Meet Molly: The Truth About MDMA, NAT’L DRUG INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE (May 1, 2012), http://teens.drugabuse.gov/blog/post/meet-molly-truth-about-ecstasy.
96. Christina L. Sein, The Agony & the Ecstasy: Preserving First Amendment
Freedoms in the Government’s War on Raves, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 139, 165 (2002)
(discussing that ecstasy is typically cut with cocaine and other drugs, although when MDMA
is a large part of ecstasy, the drug quantities are sentenced under MDMA).
97. MDMA, THE VAULTS OF EROWID, http://www.erowid.org/chemicals/mdma/mdma.
shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
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related offenses.98 Section 3(b)(1) of the Act specifically directed the
Commission to “review and amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
provide for increased penalties such that those penalties are comparable to
base offense levels for offenses involving any methamphetamine mixture,”
which, at that time, had a 1:2000 gram ratio to marijuana.99
Pursuant to Congress’s orders, the Sentencing Commission
reviewed “the available scientific and popular literature on MDMA,” and
requested input from agencies and organizations such as the Department of
Justice and the Federal Public and Community Defenders.100 Upon
receiving requests for a public hearing from the general public and from
public organizations such as the National Association for Criminal Defense
Lawyers, the Commission delayed voting on the amendment in order to
hold the requested public hearing.101 Prior to the public hearing, the
Commission planned to recommend a 1:1000 drug equivalency ratio, which
was identical to the drug equivalency ratio of heroin.102
During its decision process, the Commission received and
considered hundreds of written submissions “from a diverse array of
constituents including clinicians, physicians, psychologists, academic
researchers, users, defense attorneys, and other interests groups.”103 The
Commission considered information from the DEA about increasing
trafficking patterns and challenges faced by law enforcement, as well as
information from the National Institute on Drug Abuse about the
“pharmacological effects and health hazards associated with MDMA.”104
The Commission also considered information about the increase of MDMA
use among the nation’s youth from institutions and organizations such as
the University of Michigan, Columbia University, and the Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration.105
C. The Commission’s Findings
The Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 specifically directed the
Commission to consider and evaluate the following dangers associated with
MDMA use:
98. Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-310, §§ 3661–65, (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 290aa–5b); U.S. SENT. COMM’N, REP. TO THE CONGRESS: MDMA DRUG OFFENSE,
EXPLANATION OF RECENT GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS 2 (2001) [hereinafter MDMA REPORT].
99. Children’s Health Act of 2000 § 3664(b)(1).
100. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 3–4, 17.
101. Id. at 4 (discussing that at that time the Commission had set forth a preliminary
proposal that “would have set the penalties for MDMA trafficking equal to the penalties for
heroin trafficking”).
102. Id. at 4–5.
103. Id. at 4 (noting that the “volume of the public comment received on the proposed
changes to the guidelines for MDMA trafficking far exceed[ed] that for any issue this
Commission ha[d] addressed since taking office in November 1999”).
104. Id. at 3–4.
105. Id. at 13–15.
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(A) the rapidly growing incidence of abuse of [MDMA]
and the threat to public safety that such abuse poses;
(B) the recent increase in the illegal importation of
[MDMA];
(C) the young age at which children are beginning to use
[MDMA];
(D) the fact that [MDMA is] frequently marketed to youth;
(E) the large number of doses per gram of [MDMA]; and
(F) any other factor . . . .106
With regard to the rapid increase of MDMA-use and the resulting
threat to the public, the Commission found persuasive statistics that
showed skyrocketing MDMA-related emergency room visits
between 1994 and 2000.107 As of 1994, there were 250 MDMArelated emergency room visits, but as of 1999 there were 2,850
MDMA-related emergency room visits.108
The Commission also expressed concern regarding the “recent
increase in the illegal importation of [MDMA].”109 To support its concern,
the Commission referenced the spike in the amount MDMA that the DEA
seized within the past year: the DEA seized one million MDMA tablets in
1999, but seized three million MDMA tablets in 2000.110 The Commission
also cited U.S. Customs Service’s seizure of over nine million MDMA
tablets in 2000, which was a large increase from the three and a half million
tablets seized in 1999, and the mere 400,000 tablets seized in 1997.111
With regard to the young age of first-time MDMA users, the
Commission expressed particular concern about the “sharp increase in
MDMA use among all grade levels, as well as young adults in their early
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id. at 11 (citing OFF. OF APPLIED STUD., SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES ADMIN. (SAMHSA), CLUB DRUGS, THE DAWN (DRUG-ABUSE WARNING
NETWORK) REP. 2 (2000)).
108. Id. at 11. The Commission also mentioned the harm to user, which is discussed in
scientific detail elsewhere in the report (and is discussed within this Note later in this
section).
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at 12 (citing Statement of Donnie Marshall, Administrator, DEA, before the
U.S. Senate Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control regarding America at Risk: The Ecstasy
Threat, 2 (March 21, 2001)).
111. Id. (citing Statement by Chuck Winwood, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs
Serv., before the U.S. Senate Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control regarding America at Risk:
The Ecstasy Threat, 1 (March 21, 2001)).
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twenties.”112 The Commission also noted that, as of 2000, more American
teenagers had used MDMA than heroin.113
Along the same lines, the Commission also worried about the fact
that MDMA was being marketed toward a very young demographic.114
Specifically, the Commission was concerned with the ease of access to
MDMA, the perception among the youth demographic that MDMA carried
a “low risk of harm,” MDMA’s “reputation as a ‘feel good’ drug,”115 and
the fact that MDMA was being marketed under popular brand-names such
as “Mercedes-Benz” or “Smurfs.”116
Although Congress directed the Commission to consider “the large
number of doses per gram of [MDMA],”117 the Commission stated that this
type of information was inappropriate within the context of MDMA.118
Instead, the Commission “found more important and persuasive the fact
that, because the pills are quite small, large numbers of doses can be
transported and imported at one time.”119
Congress also told the Commission to consider “any other
appropriate factors.”120 In response, the Commission considered the
“relevant legislative history” by reviewing testimony from Congressional
hearings at which “witnesses from the Commission, [representatives of] law
enforcement agencies, researchers, and former MDMA users testified.” 121
The Commission noted that, mere months before Congress passed the
Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, “legislation was emerging from
both Houses of Congress that would have required the Commission to
increase MDMA penalties” to a level comparable to those for
methamphetamine mixtures.122
The Commission also considered feedback from the public.123 The
Commission’s report highlights the extensive amount of public comment it
112. Id. at 13 (citing Lloyd Johnston et al., “Ecstasy” Use Rises Sharply Among Teens
in 2000: Use of Many Other Drugs Steady but Significant Declines Are Reported for Some,
UNIV. OF MICH. NEWS & INFO. SERV. (Dec. 14, 2000)), available at http://www.monitoring
thefuture.org/.
113. Id. at 14 (citing P’SHIP FOR A DRUG-FREE AM., P’SHIP ATTITUDE TRACKING STUDY:
SPRING 2000, TEENS IN GRADES 7 THROUGH 12, 11 (2000)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 15.
116. Id. (citing CEWG, NIH, NIDA, EPIDEMIOLOGIC TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE, 1
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMUNITY EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKING GRP. 76, 79 (2000)).
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id. at 16 (“Although the Commission was required to consider the large dosage
amount per gram of MDMA, the Commission found this information to be inaccurate.”).
119. Id. Images of MDMA tablets can be found at Ecstasy MDMA, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/pr/multimedia-library/image-gallery/
images_ecstasy.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2014), and at DRUGS OF ABUSE, supra note 90, at
58.
120. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 3.
121. Id. at 16.
122. Id. at 16, n.58.
123. Id. at 17.
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received while it was deciding how to amend the penalties for MDMA
offenses: “Respondents included clinicians, physicians, psychologists,
academic researchers, users, defense attorneys, and other interest groups,”
as well as organizations such as “the Department of Justice, and the Federal
Public and Community Defenders.”124
Striving to make the penalty for MDMA-related offenses consistent
with the trafficking structure set forth by the DEA, which “generally
attempt[s] to distinguish between high level ‘kingpin’ distributors and low
level, local distributors,”125 the Commission considered the functional roles
of offenders in the MDMA distribution network.126
Finally, the Commission considered “collateral consequences” such
as whether violence, secondary health consequences, or environmental
harms were caused by MDMA trafficking and consumption.127 The
Commission did not find any suggestion that “substantial violence” was
associated with MDMA trafficking, and stated that “users of MDMA rarely
commit crimes to support their consumption pattern.”128 The Commission
also did not find any negative secondary health consequences that are
sometimes associated with illegal drug use, such as contracting diseases
from contaminated needles.129 Finally, since the majority of MDMA is
imported from other countries, MDMA did “not pose the same risks to the
environment as methamphetamine and amphetamine production.”130
D. The Commission’s Findings: The Empirical Basis
In making its recommendation to Congress, the Commission
reviewed and relied upon empirical data to determine the physiological
effects and harms of MDMA. The Commission noted that MDMA caused
physical effects such as “an enhanced sense of pleasure and selfconfidence, increased energy, feelings of peacefulness, acceptance,
empathy, closeness with others, and a desire to be touched.”131 The
Commission was concerned, however, about its conclusion that MDMA
124. Id. at 17.
125. Id. at 18. The functional roles for MDMA set forth by the DEA are as follows:
50,000 to 100,000 pills indicate an importer; 5,000 to 10,000 pills indicate an upper- or
middle-level distributor; 500 to 1,000 pills indicate a local distributor; 50 to 100 pills
indicate a hand-to-hand dealer at a rave.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 16, 18.
128. Id. at 19.
129. Id.
130. Id. Although there are no conclusive estimates of amphetamine production in the
United States, a significant amount of amphetamines available in the United States is
domestically produced. NAT’L DRUG INTEL. CTR., NAT’L DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2005
(Feb. 2005).
131. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 7 (citing NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NAT’L
INST. OF HEALTH, NIDA NOTES, FACTS ABOUT MDMA (ECSTASY), PUB. NO. 99-3478, at 15
(1999)).
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also produced negative effects such as “increased heart rate and blood
pressure, restlessness, jaw clenching, changes in body temperature
regulation, increased body temperature, muscle tension, next day hangover,
and a strong urge to repeat use,” despite the fact that MDMA is not
physically addictive.132 The Commission’s report reveals that the
Commission was highly influenced by concerns about MDMA’s
neurotoxicity.133 Based on the scientific reports it reviewed, the
Commission believed that neurotoxicity would result in permanent harm to
the brain that would affect important cognitive functions, such as
memory.134
The Commission formed conclusions about the harms of MDMA,
despite the fact that scientists had come to differing conclusions about both
the physical and emotional harms of MDMA in its report: “[M]uch,
although not all, of the research [found] a range of physical and emotional
hazards associated with [MDMA] use.”135 Despite acknowledging that
“[t]he potential toxicity to serotonin neurons . . . ha[d] been the subject of
some disagreement,” the Commission also concluded that MDMA was
neurotoxic. 136 Finally, the Commission concluded that MDMA caused
permanent physical harm to the user’s brain, despite admitting that “the
brain’s elasticity and redundancy may mean that any neurotoxicity caused
by the drug may not be meaningful,” and that “[a]nother point of
controversy surrounding the MDMA research literature is whether loss and
corresponding impairment of these serotonin sites is permanent.”137 So,
notwithstanding the acknowledged scientific uncertainty, the Commission
based its recommendations to Congress on its conclusions about the
physical, neurotoxic harms of MDMA.
E. The Commission’s Decision
Ultimately, the Commission declined to follow Congress’s
recommendation to treat MDMA as harshly as methamphetamine, and
decided against its initial plan to treat MDMA as harshly as heroin.138 The
Commission unanimously decided on a marijuana equivalency of 500
grams,139 which was less than heroin’s equivalency ratio of 1:1000 grams,
but more than powder cocaine’s equivalency ratio of 1:200 grams.140 The
132. Id. (citing MDMA Effects, THE VAULTS OF EROWID, http://www.erowid.org/
chemicals/mdma/mdma_effects.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 2014)).
133. Id. at 8.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 8.
137. Id. at 9–10.
138. Id. at 4–5.
139. That is, a 1:500 ratio of MDMA to marijuana. Id. at 5.
140. Id. at 4–5. The emergency amendment was promulgated on March 20, 2001, and
the permanent amendment was promulgated on April 6, 2001.
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Commission justified its decision by comparing the harms of MDMA to the
harms of both cocaine and heroin. The Commission chose a lesser ratio
than the ratio for heroin because:
(1) there are many more heroin cases in the federal system
than MDMA cases, (2) heroin is more addictive than
MDMA, (3) heroin has many more emergency room visits
and deaths associated with its use than MDMA because,
unlike MDMA which generally is taken orally, heroin is
injected, (4) heroin has more violence associated with both
its users and distribution system than MDMA, in part
because MDMA users typically do not resort to violence to
support their drug use, and (5) heroin causes greater
secondary health effects, such as the spread of HIV and
hepatitis, because it is injected.141
The Commission chose a greater ratio than the ratio for powder
cocaine, determining that MDMA was more harmful than cocaine, because
“(1) unlike MDMA, powder cocaine is not neurotoxic, (2) powder cocaine
is not as aggressively marketed to youth in the same manner as MDMA,
and (3) powder cocaine is only a stimulant, but MDMA acts as both a
stimulant and a hallucinogen.”142
The Commission believed that a 1:500 MDMA-to-marijuana ratio
was appropriate because of “the unique pharmacological and physiological
harms of ecstasy, the fact that the drug is aggressively marketed to and used
by our youth, and its importation and trafficking pattern.”143 This increased
ratio resulted in a 115% increase in MDMA-related prison sentences, which
increased the average prison sentence of an offender from thirty-four
months to seventy-three months.144 The ratio currently remains at 1:500,
and has not been reevaluated since 2001.
III. CORE PROBLEMS WITH THE MDMA DRUG EQUIVALENCY RATIO
The Commission overstated the harms of MDMA in its report,
which resulted in a drug equivalency ratio that is disproportionate to the
risks and harms of MDMA. This section analyzes the science on which the
Commission relied when making a decision about an appropriate MDMA
drug equivalency ratio, pointing out the ways in which that science was
incomplete and likely inaccurate. Next, this section discusses the failure of
the Commission to adequately compare MDMA to other drugs with regard
to the social harms caused by using and trafficking MDMA. This section
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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concludes by discussing the currently unresolved split amongst the federal
circuit courts regarding whether to defer to the Commission’s MDMA
equivalency ratio.
A. Empirical Problems with the Ratio
Much of the science on which the Commission’s 2001 decision was
based is likely inaccurate. The science on which the Commission’s decision
was based suffered from uncontrolled extraneous variables, and many
studies were conducted by a scientist who employed questionable—if not
entirely dishonest—methods. Further, recent science shows that the claim
that MDMA is neurotoxic may be incorrect. More importantly, however,
modern science does not support the Commission’s beliefs about the extent
of MDMA’s physiological harms. The Commission also failed to consider
valid scientific evidence about MDMA’s cardiotoxicity.145 The combination
of these mistakes renders the Commission’s 2001 decision unjustified, and
creates the need for the Commission to reevaluate the current MDMA drug
equivalency ratio.
1. The Commission’s Reliance on Unsound Science
As discussed in Section II, the Commission relied on several
different scientific studies in an attempt to determine the nature and extent
of the harms caused by MDMA use. The Commission’s reliance on these
scientific studies, however, is problematic. Many of the studies on which
the Commission relied were conducted by a scientist who later had to
withdraw much of his work on MDMA. This calls into question the
credibility and integrity of almost all of the scientific studies cited in the
Commission’s 2001 decision. Further, many of the scientific studies that the
Commission cites are scientifically unsound. The studies were performed
on a variety of non-human subjects, and extraneous variables were not
adequately controlled for.
The Commission’s decision about the extent of MDMA’s
physiological harms was highly influenced by its concerns about MDMA’s
neurotoxicity—specifically MDMA’s effect on serotonin transmitters
(“SERT”)146 and potential permanent harm resulting therefrom.147 A
significant amount of the scientific research that the Commission used to
justify its concerns about neurotoxicity, however, is untrustworthy. One of
145. According to the National Cancer Institute, cardiotoxicity is “toxicity that affects
the heart.” Cardiotoxicity includes “a direct effect of [a] drug on the heart [and] also an
indirect effect” due to increased blood flow or blood clot formation in blood vessels.
I. Brana & J. Tabernero, Cardiotoxicity, 21 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY vii173–vii179 (2010).
146. Serotonin transmitters take up and inactivate serotonin. LARRY R. SQUIRE,
FUNDAMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE 143 (3d ed. 2008).
147. Id. at 8.

288

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 267

the main researchers involved in many of these studies, George Ricaurte,
has employed methods that call into question his integrity as an objective
scientist. At the time of the Commission’s decision, Ricaurte’s work was
the subject of severe peer criticism.148 Scientists criticized his
methodologies and failure to account for extraneous variables and
extenuating circumstances.149 Additionally, several medical and research
professionals publically criticized Ricaurte’s work during the
Commission’s hearings.150
Despite this criticism, however, the Commission attempted to
justify its reliance on the controversial scientist’s studies in two different
ways. First, the Commission stated that Ricaurte was a “leading researcher
in MDMA toxicity studies.”151 Ricaurte was the main researcher funded by
the government to research MDMA neurotoxicity, receiving millions of
dollars in funding between 1989 and 2002.152 Second, the Commission
claimed that, because Ricaurte’s “work has appeared in peer-reviewed
scientific journals of excellent reputation,” the “method[s] of peer review
and dissemination” make the studies credible.153
Since the Commission’s 2001 decision, Ricaurte has been
surrounded by scandal. In 2003, Ricaurte was forced to retract a study
published in Science that concluded that the amount of MDMA typically
consumed by a recreational user in a single night could cause permanent
brain damage.154 The $1.3 million study had used methamphetamine instead
of MDMA, rendering all of the results invalid.155 Ricaurte had to withdraw
four additional papers, because methamphetamine was also used instead of
MDMA in four other studies performed in his lab.156 Although Ricaurte
stands behind his conclusions about the harms of MDMA, numerous wellrespected scientists have made allegations that Ricaurte’s work is unsound.
Ricaurte has been accused of “playing games with his data” to make drugs
148. Id. at 8, n.15.
149. See Grob, supra note 87, at 563–66, 573–79. Specific methodological problems
will be discussed later in this section.
150. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 8 n.15. Ricaurte’s studies were “severely
criticized by several medical/research professionals who publically commented to the
Commission during its review of the MDMA penalties.” Id.
151. Id.
152. Ilsa Jerome, NIDA & NCRR Funding for Ricaurte & McCann, MAPS (2004),
available at http://www.maps.org/mdma/ricaurtefunding.pdf (discussing that Ricaurte and
McCann, Ricaurte’s wife with whom he frequently works, received over $14.6 million
dollars for MDMA and MDMA-related research between 1989 and 2002).
153. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 8 n.15 (this proposition was apparently
supported by “at least one critic” who is not named in the Commission’s report).
154. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Research on Ecstasy Is Clouded by Errors, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2003, at F1.
155. Id. The monkeys in the study were injected with overdoses of methamphetamine,
killing two of the 10 monkeys.
156. Id. (Ricuarte claiming the labels on vials he bought in 2000 had been “somehow
switched”).
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look bad in order to win more federal grants157 and “running a cottage
industry showing that everything under the sun is neurotoxic.”158 Subjects
from Ricaurte’s studies have also reported that Ricaurte used unsound
methodologies, such as administering memory tests while subjects are jetlagged and being told “what not to admit . . . if they wanted to be in the
[compensated] study.”159 For obvious reasons, Ricaurte’s credibility has
been tarnished, making the integrity and reliability of his scientific studies
even more questionable.
The Commission relied heavily on George Ricaurte’s scientific
research in its report to Congress.160 Although the Commission’s report to
Congress cites the work of six scientists161 to support the conclusion that
MDMA is neurotoxic and has long-lasting effects on SERT, almost half of
the studies to which the Commission cites were performed by George
Ricaurte.162 Further, although Ricaurte was not always the lead or sole
scientist who conducted the studies to which the Commission cited, he was
involved in every single study.163 The Commission relied on Ricaurte’s
animal-based studies to support the conclusion that MDMA users who
consumed normal recreational doses of MDMA risked suffering lasting and
significant neurotoxic effects like damage to SERT nerve fibres164 resulting
in “significant impairments in visual and verbal memory.”165 The
Commission also relied on these studies to support the conclusion that
MDMA impairs working memory,166 which is critical to cognitive
reasoning, attention, and comprehension.167 In summary, essentially all of

157. Id. at F4 (quoting Dr. Julie Holland, a professor of psychiatry at New York
University).
158. Id. (quoting Dr. Richard J. Wurtman, a “prominent clinician at Harvard and
M.I.T.”).
159. Id. (summarizing two subjects’ descriptions of their participation in a 1996 study).
160. See GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 8–10. The section also cites two
scientific studies (by George Battaglia and James P. O’Callaghan) that do not support the
conclusion that MDMA has lasting neurotoxic effects, but it dedicates almost no discussion
to these studies and seemingly dismisses them. Id. at 8, 10 nn.14, 22.
161. Id. at 8–10 nn.13, 15–21, 23. (K.M. Hegadoren, Meltem Demirkian, George
Ricaurte, Robart Mathias, Euphrosyne Gouzoulis-Mayfrank, and G. Hatzidimitriou).
162. Id. at 8–10.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 8–9 nn.16-17 (citing George Ricaurte et al., (+ –) 3,4Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (‘Ecstasy’)-Induced Neurotoxicity: Studies in Animals, 42
NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 5–10 (2000)).
165. Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (citing ROBERT MATHIAS, NIDA NOTES, “ECSTASY”
DAMAGES THE BRAIN & IMPAIRS MEMORY IN HUMANS, PUB. NO. 99-3478, 10–11(1999)).
Although the Commission cites to Mathias, a secondary source, the information referred to
ultimately is drawn from the following study: U.D. McCann et al., Positron Emission
Tomographic Evidence of Toxic Effect of MDMA (“Ecstasy”) on Brain Serotonin Neurons
in Human Beings, 352 LANCET 1433 (1998) (G.A. Ricaurte is the fourth author of the study).
166. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 9–10 n.21.
167. Nelson Cowan, What Are the Differences Between Long-term, Short-term, and
Working Memory?, 169 PROG. IN BRAIN RES. 323 (2008).
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the Commission’s conclusions about the physical harms of MDMA are
based on Ricaurte’s studies.
In addition to Ricuarte’s credibility problems, the scientific studies
upon which the Commission relied were rife with methodological errors.
Many of the scientific studies used by the Commission in forming its 2001
decision cannot adequately establish a causal relationship to MDMA and
harms to human users. These studies used animals rather than humans as
subjects.168 In order to accurately predict MDMA-related harms for
humans, animal-based studies must use doses of MDMA that are
functionally equivalent to recreational doses of MDMA.169 Many scientists
have concerns, however, “as to whether the administered dose of MDMA
typically used to cause neurotoxicity in [animals] allows any translational
projections to be made as to the doses required to produce similar damage
in the brains of humans following recreational use of [MDMA].”170 These
animal-based studies have also been criticized as flawed, because they
neglected to consider and account for “interspecies differences in . . . drug
metabolism.”171 Specifically problematic is Ricaurte’s use of monkeys,
which appear to “have far more sensitivity to [MDMA]’s neurochemical
effects, and even at relatively low doses sustain persistent measurable
effects.”172
Yet another methodological concern stems from the failure to
control for extraneous variables such as impure MDMA and simultaneous
polydrug use173 by subjects during the studies. Even at the time of the
Commission’s decision, it was clear that establishing a scientifically sound
causal relationship between physiological harms and MDMA would be
challenging174 because of the frequent adulteration of MDMA tablets.175
“By the mid-1990s, the average MDMA tablet contained no more than forty
percent MDMA.”176 Further, MDMA users regularly used other illicit drugs
168. See, e.g., G. Hatzidimitriou et al., Altered Serotonin Innervation Patterns in the
Forebrain of Monkeys Treated with MDMA Seven Years Previously: Factors Influencing
Abnormal Recovery, 191 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5096 (1999) cited in MDMA REPORT, supra note
98, at 10 n.23.
169. A.R. Green et al., MDMA: On the Translation from Rodent to Human Dosing, 204
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 375 (2009).
170. Id.
171. Id. (stating that Ricaurte’s use of interspecies scaling has never shown to be valid
for MDMA).
172. Grob, supra note 87, at 549.
173. A common dictionary definition of “polydrug” is, “of, relating to, or being the
abuse of more than one drug especially when illicit.” Polydrug, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/polydrug (last visited Feb. 24,
2014).
174. It was also clear that the causal relationship had not yet been established to any
reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
175. Karch, supra note 86, at 21.; see also HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 71.
176. Karch, supra note 86, at 21 (stating the remaining portion of the tablets typically
contained other ingredients such as amphetamines, aspirin, caffeine, ephedrine, and even
other hallucinogens); see also HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 71.
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simultaneously with MDMA.177 This frequent polydrug use was not
properly accounted for in studies on which the Commission relied to
conclude that MDMA was neurotoxic.178 In at least one study, a drughistory questionnaire of the subjects was completely absent.179 Other
methodological problems include selecting subjects who were “unarguably
heavy users of [MDMA],”180 and a failure to remove outliers.181
2. Modern Science: MDMA May Not Be Neurotoxic
Current empirical data about MDMA and its effects is still not
entirely settled or conclusive. In fact, even within the past few years,
“despite a plethora of human and animal studies spanning more than two
decades, experts in psychopharmacology cannot reach consensus, with
some recently claiming MDMA to be largely innocuous and others
proclaiming a clear link between MDMA use and psychopathology.”182
Despite the fact that science has not provided conclusive answers to
questions about the harms of MDMA, modern research indicates that the
Commission very likely overstated the harms of MDMA.
At the time of its decision in 2001, the Commission acknowledged
that “the potential toxicity to [SERT] . . . ha[d] been the subject of some
disagreement.183 The Commission failed, however, to dedicate any
significant amount of discussion to both sides of the disagreement.184 The
Commission’s report cites, in a mere footnote, a scientific study reporting
an “absence of certain chemical markers indicative of neurotoxicity,” which
was performed by the head of the Molecular Neurotoxicology Laboratory,
Toxicology, and Molecular Biology Branch of The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention.185 The Commission drastically understated the
extent of the conflicting scientific information when it stated that there was
177. HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 71.
178. See GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 9 n.18; Grob, supra note 87, at
576–77.
179. Grob, supra note 87, at 576–77 (“Essential data characterizing these two groups,
however, is missing. Although investigators say they administered a drug-history
questionnaire to their subjects, these critical results are absent from the report.”).
180. Id. (reporting results from these groups were then extrapolated to “occasional (or
one-time) low dose MDMA [use]”).
181. Grob, supra note 87, at 577. “Indeed, if one removes the one outlier subject and
the 15 controls who had been included to weight the correlative curve, a new regression
analysis reveals no statistically significant correlation between MDMA use and transporter
density.” Id.
182. Murray R.Thompson et al., The Psychopharmacology of MDMA, in THE HEALTH
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF “ECSTASY” (MDMA) USE (Louisa Degenhardt & Wayne
Hall eds., 2010).
183. See MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 8 n.14.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 8 (citing James P. O’Callaghan, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
Defining Neurotoxicity: Lessons from MDMA & Other Amphetamines (2001)(emphasis
added)). This study was submitted to the U.S. Sentencing Commission on March 21, 2001.
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merely “some disagreement” over conclusions about MDMA’s
neurotoxicity.186 By 2001, many studies suggested that MDMA may not be
neurotoxic. For example, a 1995 study showed that MDMA neurotoxicity
was “dependent upon high core temperatures,” and that avoiding
hyperthermic states reliably blocked SERT damage.187 This means that
when an MDMA user’s core body temperature is normal (i.e., not elevated
by excessive physical exertion or a warm, poorly ventilated environment),
there will not likely be any neurotoxic effects from MDMA use.
Additionally, a 1998 study showed no statistically significant correlation
between MDMA use and SERT density (i.e., neurotoxicity) when the one
outlier subject was removed.188
Although modern science cannot yet definitely answer every
question about MDMA’s physical harms, it has provided further
clarification. A 2011 study that was designed to assess MDMA’s
neurotoxicity failed to find any “marked residual cognitive effects in
ecstasy users.”189 The study was carefully designed to minimize any
“possible sources of bias” and “limitations found in many prior
investigations.”190 The study utilized a proper control group and excluded
participants who had “significant life-time exposure to other illicit drugs or
alcohol.”191 It also required MDMA-using participants to “be members of
the ‘rave’ subculture,” and it thoroughly drug tested all participants to
exclude any possible unreported substance abuse.192 A 1999 and 2002
study, both of which used PET scans to examine neurotoxic effects on the
dopamine systems of MDMA users, did not find any neurotoxic changes—
temporary or permanent—in the users’ brains.193
186. Id.
187. Grob, supra note 87, at 570 n.152 (citing M. I. Colado et al., The Hyperthermic
and Neurotoxic Effects of ‘Ecstasy’ (MDMA) and 3,4 Methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA)
in the Dark Agouti (DA) Rat, a Model of the CYP2D6 Poor Metabolizer Phenotype, 115
BRITISH J. PHARMACOLOGY 1281 (1995); H.W. Broening et al., Age-Dependent Sensitivity of
Rats to the Long-Term Effects of the Sertonergic Neurotoxicant 3,4
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) Correlates with the Magnitude of the MDMAInduced Thermal Response,275 J. PHARMACOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS
325(1995)).
188. Grob, supra note 87, at 570 (referring to the PET scan study discussed on page 9
of the MDMA report, Grob states, “Indeed, if one removes the one outlier subject and the 15
controls who had been included to weight the correlative curve, a new regression analysis
reveals no statistically significant correlation between MDMA use and transporter density.”).
189. John H. Halpern et al., Residual Neurocognitive Features of Long-Term Ecstasy
Users with Minimal Exposure to Other Drugs, 106 ADDICTION 777 (April 2011).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. L. Reneman et al., Use of Amphetamine by Recreational Users of Ecstasy
(MDMA) Is Associated with Reduced Striatal Dopamine Transporter Densities: A
[123l]beta-CIT SPECT Study—Preliminary Report, 159 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (BERLIN)
335 (2002); D. M. Semple et al., Reduced In Vivo Binding to the Serotonin Transporter in
the Cerebral Cortex of MDMA (‘Ecstasy’) Users, 175 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 63 (1999).
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Not all studies conclude that MDMA is not neurotoxic;194 however,
the meticulously well-designed studies that have not found any evidence of
neurotoxicity make it likely that the Commission’s conclusion that MDMA
causes significant neurotoxic damage to MDMA user’s brains is incorrect.
At a minimum, these studies demonstrate the need for the Commission to
reevaluate the physical harms of MDMA and to implement a drug
equivalency ratio reflective of the seriousness of those harms.
3. Modern Science: MDMA Likely Does Not Cause Significant or Lasting
Neurological Harm
As previously discussed, modern science cannot yet definitively
answer the question of whether MDMA is neurotoxic. Despite modern
science not being completely settled, however, recent studies have made
progress and have clarified details about the harms caused by MDMA use
and details about the extent and permanence of those harms. A vast amount
of current scientific studies conclude that even if MDMA is neurotoxic, it is
highly likely the resulting neurological harm to the user is impermanent and
insignificant.
As previously mentioned, the Commission relied on Ricaurte’s
animal-based studies to conclude that MDMA users who consumed normal
recreational doses of MDMA risked suffering permanent, significant
neurotoxic effects like damage to SERT nerve fibres.195 The Commission
concluded that these neurotoxic effects cause “significant impairments in
visual and verbal memory”196 and believed this damage to be long lasting, if
not permanent.197
The Commission acknowledged, however, that some studies
suggested that any damage to SERT from MDMA use was temporary,
citing a study that found “complete neuronal regeneration in rats [a mere]
twelve months after they were exposed to MDMA.”198 The Commission’s
report, however, discounted these studies by citing an opposing study
immediately thereafter that found “damage to serotonin sites” in squirrel
194. See, e.g., Margaret Benningfield & R.L. Cowan, Brain Sertotonin Function in
MDMA (Ecstasy) Users: Evidence for Persisting Neurotoxicity, 38
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 253 (2008).
195. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 8–9 (citing George Ricaurte et al.,
(+ –) 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (‘Ecstasy’)-Induced Neurotoxicity: Studies in
Animals, 42 NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 5 (2000)).
196. Id. at 9; see supra note 165.
197. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 10 (citing G. Hatzidimitriou et al.,
Altered Serotonin Innervation Patterns in the Forebrain of Monkeys Treated with MDMA
Seven Years Previously: Factors Influencing Abnormal Recovery, 191 J. NEUROSCIENCE
5096 (1999)). Ricuarte is named as the third author of this study.
198. Id. at 10 (citing George Battaglia et al., NIDA, MDMA-Induced Neurotoxicity:
Parameters of Degeneration of Recovery of Brain Serotonin Neurons, 29 PHARMACOLOGY,
BIOCHEMISTRY, & BEHAVIOR 269 (1988)).
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monkeys that “persisted at least seven years after exposure” to MDMA.199
Strangely, however, this study did not contain any information or
discussion about whether behavioral or functional changes in the monkeys
occurred.200 Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that SERT damage
from MDMA use was, at minimum, long-lasting. 201 The Commission
included little information about studies indicating that MDMA was either
not neurotoxic or that any neurotoxic effects were temporary and
insignificant.
Studies have shown, however, that even after repeated exposure to
high doses of MDMA, serotonin nerve fibres do regenerate over time, “with
a gradual yet measurable increase in nerve fibredensity.”202 A 1993 study
showed that “low dose therapeutic” doses of MDMA, taken biweekly for a
period of four months, did not produce any lasting or functional effects.203
More recently, a 2004 study found no statistically significant difference
between the performance of MDMA users and non-users on
neuropsychological tests.204 The study results showed that moderate users
displayed “virtually no differences from non-users on any measures” of
functional cognitive defects.205 This study has been corroborated by other
studies.206
Science shows, then, that any potential neurotoxicity is highly
unlikely to be permanent or significant. This is of great importance, because
the Commission’s decision assumed that neurological harm from
neurotoxicity was permanent and would have tangible and significant
consequences on vital functions like working memory, visual memory, and
verbal memory.207 If neurological harm does not result in functional or
lasting harm to users, the debate about neurotoxicity itself seems irrelevant,
because the Commission aims not to evaluate scientifically interesting

199. Id. (citing G. Hatzidimitriou, Altered Serotonin Innervation Patterns in the
Forebrain of Monkeys Treated With MDMA Seven Years Previously: Factors Influencing
Abnormal Recovery, 191 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5096 (1999)).
200. Grob, supra note 87, at 569 n.152.
201. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 10.
202. Grob, supra note 87, at 561 n.152 (citing M. E. Molliver et al., Neurotoxicity of
MDMA & Related Compounds: Anatomic Studies, 600 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 649
(1990)).
203. Id. at 563 (citing R. Karel, Fluoxetine May Protect Against MDMA Neurotoxicity
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Aug. 6, 1993)). The study noted that this fact was established by
Ricaurte, who for political reasons or otherwise, never published this information in “the
mainstream scientific literature.”
204. J. Halpern et al., Residual Neuropsychological Effects of Illicit 3,4Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) in Individuals with Minimal Exposure to Other
Drugs, 75 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 135 (2004).
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Michael Lyvers & Penelope Hasking, Have Halpern et al. (2004)
Detected ‘Residual Neuropsychological Effects’ of MDMA? Not Likely., 75 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 149 (2004).
207. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 9.
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microbiological neurological changes, but rather aims to evaluate actual
harm to users.
4. Physiological Harms the Commission Ignored
While modern scientific studies tend to reveal that MDMA is not as
harmful as the Commission believed it to be in 2000, recent studies have
also revealed a different harm that was not previously suspected:
cardiotoxicity. Cardiotoxicity cannot justify a continued reliance on the
current MDMA drug equivalency ratio due to the small number of affected
users; however, this serves as yet another example of the Commission’s
inadequate and incomplete 2001 analysis of the harms of MDMA.
Recent scientific studies provide evidence that MDMA is
cardiotoxic. Although the causal relationship between MDMA and
myocardial fibrosis208 has not been conclusively proven in a controlled
laboratory setting, MDMA users frequently present with myocardial
fibrosis.209 This suggests that there may be a correlation between MDMA
use and myocardial fibrosis. A causal relationship between the two will
likely be exceptionally difficult to establish, however, since
methamphetamine, a drug known to cause cardiac fibrosis, is often mixed
with MDMA in ‘ecstasy’ tablets.210 There have also been reports of
MDMA-related cardiomyopathy,211 although this, too, has not yet been
replicated in a controlled laboratory setting.212 Recent science strongly
supports the conclusion that MDMA can cause valvular heart disease. A
2007 blind study tested twenty-nine MDMA users and twenty-nine nonusers who were age- and gender-matched.213 The study revealed that
approximately one-third of the MDMA-users had abnormal
echocardiograms, “compared with none in the control group.”

208. Myocardial fibrosis, which is sometimes referred to as cardiac fibrosis, occurs
when fibrous tissue forms in the heart. See Ping Kong et al., The Pathogenesis of Cardiac
Fibrosis, 71 CELLULAR & MOLECULAR LIFE SCI. 549 (2014).
209. Karch, supra note 86, at 22.
210. Id.
211. “Cardiomyopathy refers to diseases of the heart muscle,” which cause the heart
muscle to become “enlarged, thick or rigid.” What Is Cardiomyopathy?, NAT’L HEART,
LUNG, & BLOOD INST., http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/cm/ (last visited
Feb. 21, 2014). Ultimately, cardiomyopathy weakens the heart and can result in heart failure
or arrhythmias. Id.
212. Karch, supra note 86, at 22 (“Case reports describing MDMA-related
cardiomyopathy appear sporadically, but no controlled trials, in man or animal, have ever
been published. Rats exposed to high doses of MDMA do develop eccentric left ventricular
dilation and diastolic dysfunction . . . though whether these changes occur in humans is
impossible to say.”).
213. Id. at 22–23 (citing S. Droogmans et al., Possible Association Between 3, 4Methylenedioxymethamphetamine Abuse & Valvular Heart Disease, 100 AM. J.
CARDIOLOGY, 1442 (2007)).
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Although MDMA can likely cause heart disease, modern science
also has shown that valvular heart disease is reversible and that the number
of MDMA users who actually present with this disease “is so low as to
hardly be worth a mention.”214 As such, MDMA’s potential cardiotoxicity
cannot justify continued use of the current MDMA drug equivalency ratio
without further reevaluation from the Commission.
B. The Commission’s Social Concerns
In addition to being based on empirical evidence about MDMA’s
physiological harms, the Commission’s 2001 decision was also based on
numerous social concerns. Recent data supports the Commission’s findings
and concerns about the prevalence of MDMA usage among the nation’s
youth, the general rise in popularity of MDMA use, and the increase in
MDMA trafficking patterns; however the data does not support the
Commission’s ranking of MDMA’s social harms relative to other illicit
drugs, such as cocaine. A review of both current and then-existing data
clearly shows that, on the whole, cocaine is much more harmful than
MDMA. Despite this, MDMA’s drug equivalency ratio is 250% higher than
cocaine’s. Because the Commission’s 2001 decision was primarily based on
a comparison of MDMA to cocaine and heroin, the fact that cocaine is
much more harmful than MDMA clearly shows that the current MDMA
ratio is fatally flawed.
1. Harm to America’s Youth
Although recent data generally supports the Commission’s
concerns about MDMA perception and use among the nation’s youth
demographic, a comparison of youth perception and use of MDMA and
youth perception and use of drugs such as cocaine and marijuana show that
this concern cannot justify MDMA’s current 500:1 ratio.
The Commission’s report states that the Commission was
concerned about MDMA’s impact on the nation’s youth demographic. This
concern was justified by data that revealed “sharp increases in MDMA use
among all grade levels, as well as young adults in their early 20s,” as well
as with the availability of the drug to the youth.215 The Commission was
also concerned with the fact that MDMA was being marketed toward the
youth in the rave circuit and in schools, commonly with “brand” or
“designer” names imprinted on the MDMA, as well as with the youth’s
perception of MDMA as a low-risk “feel good” drug.216
Recent data suggests that the Commission’s concern about the
youth’s perception of MDMA was valid. Statistics show a sharp decrease in
214. Id.
215. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 13, 15.
216. Id. at 15.
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the percentage of eighth through twelfth graders who perceive MDMA use
as harmful.217 In fact, the percentage of eighth and tenth graders who
perceive MDMA as harmful is lower than it was in 2001, with only 25% of
eighth graders and 37% of tenth graders seeing great risk in trying
ecstasy.218 Also supporting the Commission’s concern is data revealing that
the perception of the harmfulness of cocaine is much higher than that of
MDMA: 43% of eighth graders and 53% of tenth graders thought trying
powder cocaine once or twice involved great risk.219
MDMA usage among teens and young adults also remains
prevalent. Recent statistics show that MDMA use among the youth
demographic may, once again, be on the rise. The percentage of twelfthgrade MDMA users declined by more than 50% in the aftermath of harsher
MDMA guidelines; however, use among twelfth graders has gradually risen
since 2005.220 Since 2005, there has been a “modest rebound” in MDMA
use among middle school and high school students, and in 2010 there was a
“significant increase [in MDMA use]” in eighth and tenth grade.”221
According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment authored by the
National Drug Intelligence Center, “MDMA use is increasing, reaching the
highest levels of use since 2002.”222 “Clearly the very substantial decline in
ecstasy use has ended, and we may be seeing a rebound in the use of this
drug” among teenagers.223
Despite these increased rates of use, however, MDMA use among
teens does not justify the 500:1 ratio when compared with other types of
drug use among teens. In 2012, 2% of eighth graders, 5% of tenth graders,
and 7.2% of twelfth graders reported having used MDMA at least one
time.224 The number of teens who had used cocaine was lower, but not
drastically lower, with 1.9% of eighth graders, 3.3% of tenth graders, and
217. LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., 1 MONITORING THE FUTURE: NAT’L SURVEY RESULTS
ON DRUG USE, 1975–2013: OVERVIEW, KEY FINDING ON ADOLESCENT DRUG USE 35 (2014),
available at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/mtf-overview2013.pdf
(“From 2004 to 2011 we saw a troubling drop in perceived risk (first among eighth and
tenth, and then among twelfth graders) . . . [suggesting] a generational forgetting of the
dangers of ecstasy use resulting from generational replacement.”).
218. LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., INST. FOR SOC. RES., UNIV. OF MICH., MONITORING THE
FUTURE: NAT’L SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975–2011: VOLUME I, SECONDARY SCHOOL
STUDENTS 155 (2012), available at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/
mtf-vol1_2011.pdf [hereinafter MONITORING THE FUTURE 2012].
219. Id.
220. Id. at 155–56.
221. Id.; NAT’L DRUG INTEL. CTR., NAT’L DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2011, 32 (2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf [hereinafter
NAT’L DRUG ASSESSMENT 2011].
222. NAT’L DRUG ASSESSMENT 2011, supra note 221, at 32.
223. MONITORING THE FUTURE 2012, supra note 218, at 166.
224. LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., INST. FOR SOC. RES., UNIV. OF MICH., MONITORING THE
FUTURE: NAT’L SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975–2012: VOLUME I, SECONDARY SCHOOL
STUDENTS 111 (2013), available at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/
mtf-vol1_2012.pdf. [hereinafter MONITORING THE FUTURE 2013].
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4.9% of twelfth graders reporting having previously used cocaine.225 Data
from 2011 also reveals similar rates of use of MDMA and cocaine. In 2011,
2.6% of eighth graders, 6.6% of tenth graders, and 8% of twelfth graders
said that they had previously used MDMA.226 Again, the number of teens
who had used cocaine was lower, but not drastically lower: 2.2% of eighth
graders, 3.3% of tenth graders, and 5.2% of twelfth graders admitted using
cocaine previously.227 Further, in 2013 the DEA reported an overall decline
in MDMA use among the youth demographic since 2010.228 Most
compelling, however, is data about the number of teens who have
previously used marijuana—which carries a Guidelines penalty 500 times
lower than MDMA: 16.4% of eighth graders, 34.5% of tenth graders, and
45.5% of twelfth graders reported having previously used marijuana.229
2. Emergency Room Data
Emergency room data concerning young MDMA users may
generally support the Commission’s concerns about MDMA’s effect on
teens and young adults, as well as its concerns about an increase in MDMA
use. Current data, however, continues to show that cocaine, which carries a
significantly smaller Guidelines penalty, results in a much greater
percentage of serious bodily injury and emergency room visits.
MDMA-related emergency room visits have increased by 114%
from 2004 through 2010.230 The increase was gradual from 2004-2010, but
“appear[s] to [have] stabilize[d] between 2009 and 2010.”231 Estimates for
2011 MDMA-related emergency room visits also support the notion that
this number is stabilizing.232 The vast majority of these MDMA-related
emergency room visits occurred among 12 to 24 year-olds, while the
225. Id.
226. MONITORING THE FUTURE 2012, supra note 218, at 107.
227. Id.
228. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., NAT’L DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2013, 17 (2013),
available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/resource-center/DIR-017-13%20NDTA%20
Summary%20final.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L DRUG ASSESSMENT 2013] (drawing its conclusion
from Monitoring the Future data, which showed a decline in MDMA use from 3.06% in
2010 to 3.1% in 2011, and National Survey on Drug Use and Health data, which showed a
decline in MDMA use from 1.7% in 2010 to 1.9% in 2011).
229. MONITORING THE FUTURE 2012, supra note 218, at 107.
230. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN., DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK 2010: NAT’L ESTIMATES OF DRUGRELATED EMERGENCY DEP’T VISITS (2012), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/2k13/
DAWN2k10ED/DAWN2k10ED.pdf [hereinafter DAWN]. There were 10,227 MDMArelated Emergency Room visits in 2004, compared to 21,836 in 2010.
231. DAWN, supra note 230, at 39.
232. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN., NAT’L ESTIMATES OF DRUG-RELATED EMERGENCY DEP’T VISITS, 2004-2011
0 ILLICITS (EXCLUDING ALCOHOL) (2011), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/DAWN.
aspx#DAWN 2011_ED_Excel_Files–National Tables (Estimating 22,498 MDMA-related
emergency room visits in 2011, 21,836 in 2010 and 22,847 in 2009).
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majority of cocaine-related visits occurred among those who were 25 years
of age and older.233
Compared to users of other drugs, however, MDMA users present
to the emergency room much less frequently.234 The Commission itself
noted that “emergency room admission and deaths attributed to use of
[MDMA] continue to be less frequent than with other drugs of abuse.”235 In
fact, MDMA-related emergency room visits comprise only 1.9% of drugrelated emergency room visits.236 Cocaine-related emergency room visits,
on the other hand, were much more frequent than MDMA-related
emergency room visits.237 In people twenty-one years of age or older,
cocaine-related visits comprised 210.7 visits per 100,000 population, as
opposed to MDMA-related visits which comprised only 4.7 visits per
100,000 people.238 In people who were twenty years of age or younger,
cocaine-related ER visits comprised 23.8 visits per 100,000 people as
opposed to MDMA-related visits which comprised only 12.9 visits per
100,000 people.239 Even heroin-related visits surpassed MDMA-related
visits, with 93 visits per 100,000 people who were twenty-one years of age
or older and 21.2 visits per 100,000 people twenty years of age or
younger.240 MDMA-related emergency room visits also occur much less
frequently than emergency room visits related to alcohol, amphetamines,
marijuana and PCP.241 In conclusion, emergency-room related data, while
supporting the Commission’s concerns, does not support the Commission’s
treatment of MDMA relative to other illicit drugs.
3. Drug Trafficking Patterns
The Commission, through its report, expressed concern about the
increase of illegal MDMA trafficking and importation by both individuals
and drug trafficking organizations.242 The Commission also shared the
DEA’s concerns about future increases in MDMA trafficking due to
MDMA’s “easy manufacture, relatively benign reputation, and huge
233. DAWN, supra note 230, at 34, tbl. 6 (12–24 year-olds comprised 72.3% of
MDMA-related emergency room visits while 86% of cocaine-related emergency room visits
involved patients who were 25 years of age or older).
234. Id. at 34, tbl. 6.
235. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 11.
236. DAWN, supra note 230, at 4, fig.1.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. PCP, or phencyclidine, is an illegal drug that can cause illusions, auditory
hallucinations, “feelings of strength, anxiety, aggression, . . . hostility, . . . delusions,
paranoia, and catatonia.” NAT’L DRUG INTEL. CTR., INTEL. BULLETIN: PCP: INCREASING
AVAILABILITY AND ABUSE (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs8/
8180/.
242. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 12.
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markup,” noting that “the MDMA business has even proved irresistible to
many not otherwise involved in drugs.”243 Although MDMA trafficking
declined immediately after the 2001 MDMA guidelines were established,
there was a significant increase in MDMA trafficking from 2007 through
2010. Data from 2007 through 2010 “shows high levels of MDMA
seizures” in the United States, with more than 15.1 million MDMA dosage
units seized.244 “The amount of MDMA seized along the Northern Border
increased overall from more than 1.9 million tablets in FY2006 to more
than 3.9 million tablets in FY2010, the greatest amount seized in the past 5
years.”245 Further, “the average load size of these seizures” was continuing
to increase.246 Data in 2011 also revealed an increase in trafficking activity
in the Southwest Border region, where MDMA seizures almost tripled from
2009, when 547,707 tablets were seized, to 2010, when 1,545,607 tablets
were seized.247
Recently, however, MDMA trafficking has sharply declined. The
DEA reported that only 173,749 dosage units and 390 kilograms of MDMA
were seized in 2012, which was “significantly less than the approximately
1.9 million dosage units and 675 kilograms seized in 2011.”248 In its 2013
National Drug Threat Assessment report, the DEA summarized its findings
by concluding that “surveys, seizure and treatment data suggest availability
and abuse of [MDMA] may have peaked.”249 This recent data indicates that
the Commission’s concerns about future increases in MDMA trafficking,
although valid in 2000, are no longer supported by data about MDMA
trafficking and availability.
Production of MDMA within the United States has increased over
the past decade. The 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment stated that the
rise of Asian and Mexican criminal organizations have resulted in high
levels of MDMA production and availability in the United States.250
Despite a rise in MDMA production, however, there are still a relatively
“small amount” of MDMA laboratories in the United States.251 2013 data
indicating a low level of MDMA availability throughout the United States

243. Id. at 12–13.
244. NAT’L DRUG ASSESSMENT 2011, supra note 221, at 30.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 31.
248. NAT’L DRUG ASSESSMENT 2013, supra note 228, at 17. A National Drug Threat
Assessment was not created in 2012, due to the closure of the National Drug Intelligence
Center in June of 2012. The DEA began creating the yearly National Drug Threat
Assessment in 2013. Id. at iii.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG &
CHEMICAL EVALUATION SECTION (Apr. 2013) http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug_
chem_info/mdma.pdf.
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supports the conclusion that MDMA production within the United States
remains small.252
Just as the recent decrease in MDMA trafficking calls into question
the validity of the Commission’s concerns about MDMA drug trafficking
patterns, the Commission’s treatment of MDMA relative to cocaine is also
unjustified. Even before the sharp decrease in MDMA trafficking, MDMA
trafficking made up a much smaller percentage of trafficking than other
drugs, “including cannabis, cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin.”253
Further, MDMA trafficking is not associated with violence, unlike cocaine
trafficking, which primarily occurs through Hispanic gangs who largely
control the market through intimidation and force.254
C. Federal Court Split
Problems with the basis for the Commission’s decision to enact a
500:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio have not gone unnoticed. Recently,
defendants across the country have been challenging the MDMA
guidelines. Since 2011, several federal district courts have wrestled with the
problem, resulting in a disagreement among the courts about how to
properly handle the issue. Some federal district courts have deviated from
the Guidelines’ MDMA ratio on the grounds that the 500:1 ratio is
empirically unsupportable; these courts have elected to apply substantially
lower MDMA drug equivalency ratios.255 Other federal district courts,
however, have declined to reject the Guidelines’ ratio due to sentencing
uniformity concerns as well as concerns about the amount of judicial
resources required to properly review all of the relevant scientific data.256
Federal appellate courts have not overturned decisions to deviate from or
decisions to adhere to the Guidelines ratio. Because of the deference given
to sentencing judges in the appellate review process, the federal district
court split will likely remain until the Commission reevaluates the current
MDMA ratio.
1. Deviation from the 500:1 MDMA Drug Equivalency Ratio
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York was the first of the federal district courts to grapple with the issue of
whether the 500:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio would result in “a
sentence that is greater than necessary to serve the objectives of
252. NAT’L DRUG ASSESSMENT 2013, supra note 228, at 17.
253. NAT’L DRUG INTEL. CTR., NAT’L DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2010, 31 (2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf.
254. Id. at 12–13.
255. See United States v. McCarthy, No. 09-CR-1136, 2011 WL 1991146 at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2011); United States v. Qayyem, No. 10-CR-19, 2012 WL 92287 at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2012).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Kamper, 860 F. Supp. 2d 596, 603 (E.D. Tenn. 2012).

302

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 267

sentencing.”257 In United States v. McCarthy, the court held an extensive
evidentiary hearing in which it heard expert testimony from four expert
witnesses regarding the soundness and validity of the empirical studies on
which the MDMA drug equivalency ratio was based.258 The court
determined that some of the Commission’s findings were valid. For
example, the court stated that recent scientific research had not
compromised the Commission’s findings about MDMA’s neurotoxicity to
the extent that they were undoubtedly false.259 The court also found the
Commission’s findings “that MDMA is uniquely marketed to—and
prevalent within—the younger population” to be valid.260
The court was not, however, persuaded as to the validity of all of
the Commission’s findings. The court also noted that the Commission
incorrectly characterized MDMA as a hallucinogen,261 and took issue with
the Commission’s comparison of MDMA to cocaine.262 The court
specifically mentioned the fact that: (1) there are far more cocaine-related
emergency room visits than there are MDMA-related emergency room
visits; (2) cocaine use causes health risks not caused by MDMA use, such
as “cardiovascular effects, including disturbances in heart rhythm and heart
attacks; respiratory effects, such as chest pain and respiratory failure; and
neurological effects, including strokes and seizures”; and (3) cocaine
trafficking, unlike MDMA tracking, is connected with “substantial
violence.”263 The court concluded that the Commission’s comparison of the
relative impacts of MDMA and cocaine was “selective and incomplete”:
“For example, instead of comparing the full range of the health effects of
MDMA and cocaine, the Commission focused only on a single health
effect: neurotoxicity. In doing so, the Commission ignored several effects
of cocaine that render it significantly more harmful than MDMA.”264
The court further stated that the Commission’s flawed comparison
of MDMA to cocaine rendered the Guidelines’ MDMA penalties
“incompatible with the goal of uniform sentencing based on empirical
data.”265 Specifically, the Court felt that when “disparate drug equivalencies
are established for similar narcotics based on an incomplete analysis,” the
fundamental “need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct” is “violated.”266

257. McCarthy, No. 09-CR-1136, 2011 WL 1991146 at *1.
258. Id.
259. Id. at *2.
260. Id.
261. Id. at *3.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *3–*4 (citations omitted).
264. Id. at *3
265. Id. at *3–*4.
266. Id. at *4 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553).
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Although the court disagreed with the Commission’s MDMA
penalties, it also rejected the defendant’s request of either a 1:1 ratio or the
“pre-2001 ratio of 35:1,” deferring “to the Commission’s determination . . .
that the pre-2001 MDMA Guidelines were too low.”267 The court noted
that, although there are several ways in which MDMA is less harmful than
cocaine, there are also unique dangers associated with MDMA use.268
Ultimately, the court chose to adopt a 200:1 marijuana-to-MDMA drug
equivalency ratio, “equal to that of cocaine.”269
Less than seven months later, in United States v. Qayyem, another
district court judge in the Southern District of New York declined to apply
the 500:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio.270 The court reviewed anew the
current scientific research about MDMA but also stated that it “relie[d]
heavily upon the evidentiary findings set forth in McCarthy.”271 The court
expressed many of the same concerns about the Commission’s comparison
of MDMA and cocaine expressed by the McCarthy court, such as the
Commission’s failure “to compare MDMA to cocaine using the same fivefactor rubric” it used in its comparison of MDMA and heroin, the lesser
violence associated with MDMA trafficking as opposed to cocaine
trafficking, and the Commission’s faulty categorization of MDMA as a
hallucinogen.272 In addition to these concerns, the Qayyem court
emphasized that MDMA was not nearly as addictive as cocaine, citing to a
study that found that “MDMA consistently ranked in the bottom quartile of
all three major categories of harm.”273 These categories included “(1)
physical harm to the individual user; (2) the tendency of the drug to induce
physical and psychological dependence; and (3) social harm, defined as the
effect of drug use on families, communities, and society.”274
Although the court disagreed with much of the Commission’s
analysis, the court did agree with the Commission’s concerns about
“[MDMA’s] potential neurotoxicity, coupled with its popularity among
youth.”275 Ultimately, however, the court concluded that the 500:1 ratio
“chosen by the Commission does not accurately reflect the then-existing
research, nor is it supported by more recent evidence.”276 The court
declined to apply the 100:1 drug equivalency ratio requested by the
defendant in this case, but, on the grounds that the 500:1 ratio was “greater
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. No. 10-CR-19, 2012 WL 92287 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2012).
271. Id. at *2.
272. Id. at *3–*4.
273. Id. at *4 (citing United States v. McCarthy, No. 09-CR-1136, 2011 WL 1991146
at *2 and D. Nutt et al., Development of a Rational Scale to Assess the Harm of Drugs of
Potential Misuse, 369 LANCET 1047 (2007)).
274. Id. (citing Nutt et. al, supra note 273, at 1047).
275. Id. at *5.
276. Id.
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than necessary to serve the objectives of sentencing,” the Qayyem court,
like the McCarthy court, adopted a 200:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio
instead.277
2. Adherence to the 500:1 MDMA Drug Equivalency Ratio
Not all courts have agreed with the decision to adopt a 200:1
marijuana-to-MDMA drug equivalency ratio, however. In United States v.
Kamper, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee upheld the current 500:1 marijuana-to-MDMA ratio, rejecting
the defendant’s request to reduce the ratio.278 The Court declined the chance
to “categorically reject” and replace the MDMA drug equivalency ratio,
reasoning that the Commission, not the court, is in the best position to make
this decision.279 The court emphasized that the Sentencing Commission is in
a better position to determine an appropriate drug equivalency ratio for
MDMA, because the determination necessarily involves the review and
consideration of extensive scientific data, value judgments about the
relative harm of MDMA, and national public policy issues.280 The court
explained that “an individual federal district court judge simply cannot
marshal resources akin to those available to the Commission for tackling
the manifold issues involved with determining a proper drug
equivalency.281
The court in Kamper also expressed great concern about the
inherent administrative problems with a “reject-and-replace approach”—the
exact approach for which the defendant in this case argues:
Federal law provides for 667 district court judgeships.
Under [the defendant’s] approach, every single one of these
judges could reject the MDMA-to-marijuana ratio under
the Guidelines and replace that ratio. . . . This approach
would almost certainly produce the kind of unwarranted
sentencing disparities § 3553 attempts to avoid.
A sentence for an MDMA defendant would be based not on
the facts and laws of each case, but on the ratio employed
by the particular sentencing judge, where even different
judges in the same courthouse could rely on different

277. Id. at *1.
278. 860 F. Supp.2d 596, 603 (E.D. Tenn. 2012).
279. Id. at 607.
280. Id. at 606–07.
281. Id. at 607.

2014] FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES’ TREATMENT OF MDMA

305

ratios. In the face of such a haphazard process, the public
would rightfully lose respect for the courts.282
Finally, the court also expressed concerns with regard to proper
separation of powers.283 The court believed that the defendant, by
requesting that the court abandon the 500:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio,
was “in essence ask[ing] the Court to step into the shoes of Congress and
the Commission and legislate a change to the drug equivalency table under
the Guidelines.”284 Noting that the decision in Kimbrough “did not alter this
fundamental structural principle” of separation of powers, the court
expressed its unwillingness to deviate from the Guidelines and create a new
MDMA drug equivalency ratio.285
Just two weeks after Kamper, a federal district court judge in the
Southern District of Illinois similarly declined to deviate from the
Commission’s 500:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio.286 The judge admitted
that there is “considerable uncertainty . . . as to the science and policies
underlying the marijuana-to-MDMA ratio,”287 but he deferred to the
Commission’s ratio anyway, simply stating that the defendant’s “arguments
that the current MDMA Guideline/ratio is unworthy of application-acrossthe-board or in this particular case” were unpersuasive.288 His decision to
defer to the Commission in this instance appears to be based, in part, on the
fact that he “has considerably less experience with MDMA cases than
cocaine cases.”289 The judge believed this to be relevant “in that [a] Judge
may defer more to the Commission in less familiar territory.”290 The Court
also emphasized that, although it would be permitted to “delve into the
history of a guideline or review and assess the deliberative process of the
Commission in establishing that guideline in order to properly sentence a
defendant,” it was not required to do so.291
Despite the Court’s adherence to the 500:1 MDMA ratio, however,
the court declared that, “[a]t some point in the future, there may be an
appropriate case in which to consider afresh whether deviation from the
MDMA Guidelines is merited based on new development, research, or
caselaw.”292

282. Id. at 605.
283. Id. at 604.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. United States v. Thompson, No. 10-CR-30168-01, 2012 WL 1884661 at *5 (S.D.
Ill. May 23, 2012).
287. Id. at *5 (citing Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d at 610).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. (citing United States v. Aguilar-Huerta, 576 F.3d 365, 367–68 (7th Cir. 2009)).
292. Id. at *5.
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In June of 2012, the Federal District Court of the Western District
of Michigan declined to reduce a defendant’s sentence by recalculating the
sentencing using the 200:1 marijuana-to-MDMA ratio adopted by the
McCarthy court.293 The court reasoned that the discovery of new scientific
data merely creates an argument that the court should deviate from the
Commission’s guidelines, which does not raise an issue of “constitutional
magnitude,” nor does it “render the entire proceedings invalid.”294 In late
2012, United States v. Thannavong, a federal district court in the Middle
District of Tennessee followed in the footsteps of the Kamper court, also
upholding the current 500:1 marijuana-to-MDMA ratio.295 The district court
in Thannavong based its decision, however, on “the large extent of the drug
conspiracy, the national scope, the amount of money, and the large quantity
of marijuana” involved.296
3. Adherence/Deviation: An Abuse of Discretion?
To date, the Sixth Circuit,297 Seventh Circuit,298 and Tenth
Circuit have reviewed the application of the 500:1 marijuana-to-MDMA
ratio, and all three courts held that the application of the 500:1 ratio is not
unreasonable. In United States v. Ferguson, the Defendant appealed his
sentence, arguing, “[T]he District Court’s application of the 1:500 ratio was
unreasonable in light of empirical data suggesting that the ratio is unduly
harsh and otherwise lacks justification.”300 The Tenth Circuit, reviewing for
abuse of discretion, upheld the district court’s decision to apply the 500:1
MDMA drug equivalency ratio.301 The court stated a sentencing judge has
discretion to deviate from the “advisory conversions” of the Guidelines
when he or she “disagrees with the policy or harshness” of the advisory
299

293. Hughes v. United States, 1:11-CV-1028, 2012 WL 1981715 at *1, *3 (W.D. Mich.
June 1, 2012).
294. Id. at *1–*2 (citing Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir.
2005)). The court also denied the defendant’s motion, which was based on 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
because the defendant had not filed his motion within the one-year statute of limitations and
because, “[w]hen the claimed error is a constitutional error, § 2255 affords relief only when
the error has a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence’ on the proceedings.” Id.
295. 533 F. App’x 589, 592 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied No. 13–7438, 2014 WL
102832 (2014).
296. Id. at 593. Specifically, during the sentencing hearing, the district court judge said,
“It wasn’t just Ecstasy, it was marijuana. It wasn’t just one transaction, there were many. It
was national, interstate, in structure, in transactions, lots of money, weapons. And to me,
that’s a different set of dangers separate and apart from just the fact that Ecstasy is involved
and the Commission thinks it’s 500. For purposes of sentencing here, it’s the facts of the
offense and the commercial aspects of the offense that, to me, take it outside the scope of this
policy differences on health effects of health dangers of Ecstasy.” Id. (emphasis added).
297. Thannavong, 533 F. App’x at 592; Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d at 610.
298. United States v. Scott, 527 F. App’x 539 (7th Cir. 2013).
299. United States v. Ferguson, 447 F. App’x 898, 902 (10th Cir. 2012).
300. Id. at 902–03.
301. Id.
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penalty.302 The court nevertheless emphasized that the fact that judges are
permitted to deviate from the Guidelines does not make it “an abuse of
discretion for a judge to adhere to the equivalency table, policy critiques
notwithstanding.”303 The Tenth Circuit, however, made no commentary
about the appropriateness of the MDMA drug equivalency ratio itself.304
In United States v. Thannavong, the Sixth Circuit also upheld the
district court’s decision to apply the 500:1 MDMA ratio.305 In its opinion,
the court highlighted “the fact that a district judge may disagree with a
guideline for policy reasons and may reject the Guidelines range because of
that disagreement does not mean the court must reject the Guidelines range
if it disagrees.”306 The Sixth Circuit, however, conceded that, “in an
appropriate case,” the 500:1 MDMA-to-marijuana ratio may “overstate[]
the nature of the offense and the need for the sentence imposed.”307 Finally,
the Seventh Circuit upheld an application of the 500:1 ratio where the
district court failed to address the defendant’s argument that the ratio was
inappropriate.308 The court stated that the district court was not obligated
“to answer the abstract policy argument that the ratio defined in the Drug
Equivalency Table is unworthy of application in any case . . . .”309
Because abuse of discretion is the standard of review for sentencing
decisions, it is highly unlikely that any federal appellate court will overturn
a lower court’s application of the Commission’s current MDMA drug
equivalency ratio. Even if an appellate court expressed doubt about the
validity of the Commission’s basis for the ratio, such commentary would be
mere dicta and would not have any binding effect on the lower courts. It is,
therefore, highly unlikely that arguments to the federal appellate courts will
result in a solution to the current problem with the MDMA guidelines.
IV. A CALL FOR REEVALUATION
The many errors made by the Commission in formulating the
current MDMA drug equivalency ratio render the current ratio questionable
at best. The unresolved federal district court split, as previously detailed in
Part III, threatens horizontal sentencing uniformity. Further, considerable
judicial resources have already been used to analyze scientific research and
expert testimony in an attempt to draw a proper conclusion about the harms
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. 533 F. App’x 589, 593 (6th Cir. 2013).
306. Id. (quoting United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 800 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis
in original)).
307. Id. The Court also noted that the “[a]ppellant bears a heavy burden in seeking
reversal of a district court’s decision to reject a categorical attack on the sentencing formula
promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.” Id.
308. United States v. Scott, 527 F. App’x 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2013).
309. Id. (citations omitted).
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of MDMA use and trafficking. The erroneous foundation of the current
MDMA penalties, combined with the federal district court split and the
need for judicial efficiency, mandate a prompt reevaluation of the current
MDMA drug equivalency ratio by the Commission.
In light of the new knowledge about the physiological harms that
can be gleaned from modern science, as well as the disagreement among
district courts, the U.S. Sentencing Commission should promptly reevaluate
the current MDMA drug equivalency ratio.310 Without reevaluation, the
future inevitably will consist of the use of an inordinate amount of judicial
resources spent on determining proper equivalency ratios, an everincreasing amount of appeals of MDMA-related sentencing decisions, and
increasing instances of sentencing disparity among defendants.
A reexamination of the MDMA Guidelines would not necessarily
have to—but, based on current data, likely should—lead to a reduction of
the MDMA penalties. The importance of a well-founded, well-reasoned
drug equivalency ratio far outweighs the importance of the actual outcome
of the reevaluation itself. A reexamination of the MDMA Guidelines will
require the Commission to perform a new analysis of the scientific research
about the physical harms of MDMA and a new analysis of the social
policies and rationale behind MDMA penalties. Ideally, the Commission
should not start from its 2001 decision, but rather should start fresh and
focus solely on the most credible data available. The Commission should
perform a complete analysis of how the harms of MDMA compare to the
harms of other drugs such as cocaine, heroin, marijuana, etc.
The Commission must reexamine the MDMA drug equivalency
ratio because there are no other satisfactory alternative remedies. The
current district court split will only grow. Courts do not have the resources
of the Commission to develop empirically-supported Guidelines, because
extensive fact-finding and specialized expertise is required to make
informed decisions about drug equivalency ratios. Courts may end up using
an inordinate amount of judicial resources to develop Guidelines, which is
an extraordinarily inefficient use of judicial resources. If courts do not use
adequate resources when implementing their own MDMA ratio, however,
there is a large risk that the courts will apply disproportionate ratios.
Alternatively, courts that decline to implement a new ratio because of the
administrative problems will continue to implement sentences that are
greater than necessary to adequately protect the public, serve as an effective
deterrent, and provide sufficient retribution.311 Not only is this
fundamentally unfair, but it flies in the face of the statutory sentencing
policies set forth in § 3553(a).
310. There is also an apparent need for further scientific studies about and evaluation of
the effects of MDMA. Further studies should specifically control for extraneous variables
such as simultaneous polydrug use, adulterated MDMA tablets, and extensive prior abuse of
illicit substances.
311. See U.S.C. 18 § 3553(a) (2012).
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Blatant problems with the crack-cocaine Guidelines remained in
place for twenty years, because Congress (and, for quite some time, the
Commission) refused to act to solve the problem. The implementation of
fundamentally unfair crack cocaine sentences for two decades led to “one
of the greatest stains on our federal criminal justice system.”312 The current
MDMA Guidelines have been in place for over twelve years. It is time.
Both the Commission313 and Congress have the authority to reexamine the
MDMA Guidelines, and yet neither body has given any indication that it
intends to tackle the problem. In order to avoid repeating its past mistakes,
it is imperative that the Commission promptly reevaluate the current
MDMA sentencing policies.

312. Cratty, supra note 4.
313. The Commission has an ongoing responsibility to review and refine the
Guidelines.
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